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The article points out the limits of Austrian economics in so far as the 
passage from positive to normative economics is concerned. We propose a 
comparison with neoclassical economics and discuss the different theoretical 
solutions adopted by these two schools of thought in their legitimization of 
the normative discourse. The bridge from positive to normative economics is 
analyzed as resting upon two interdependent pillars, one of a technical 
nature, the other of an ethical one. In the case of neoclassical theory, these 
two pillars are, respectively, the “Pareto principle” and the so-called 
“minimal benevolence principle”. In the case of Austrian economics, they 
are the “coordination principle” and the set of “quasi-universal” value 
judgements. A first problem for Austrian economics is that the coordination 
principle turns out to be incompatible with process analysis, the latter being 
a central theoretical tenet of the Austrian school. A second problem, which 
overwhelms both the schools of thought, has to do with distribution. Our 
thesis is that whereas the neoclassical solution of the distributive problem is 
formally consistent (although deeply unrealistic), the Austrian solution is 
theoretically untenable and based on strong, although implicit, value 
judgements.   1
1. Introduction 
 
The intrusion of value judgements in economic analysis can take place at 
different levels. As Myrdal has pointed out, value judgements necessarily come into play 
at the decisive step of the choice of the problem to investigate (Myrdal 1969). At this 
level, the only thing to do in the attempt to separate ideological statements from 
scientific investigation is to explicitly state right from the beginning the motivations and 
the reasons that lead the choice of the field of investigation and the particular definition 
of the problem adopted. At a lower level, when the purpose is to define a body of 
normative economics to appraise the different policies of a capitalist state, some stronger 
value judgements are implicitly introduced, since capitalism as a system is taken as 
given: the value statement that is introduced is that remuneration should depend on 
performance. That remuneration depends on performance is a fact in capitalism and the 
value judgement in question is simply the moral approval of it (Harsanyi 1976). Finally, 
the approaches that build their positive frameworks on the assumptions of 
methodological individualism (which is the case of both Austrian and neoclassical 
economics) often espouses also some form of ideological individualism when passing to 
normative analysis: one thing is to say that economic processes and states of affairs must 
be explained starting from the individual, another thing is to say that the individual is the 
best judge of his own well-being. The former is a methodological position, the latter an 
ideological one (Blaug 1980). 
In this paper, we do not focus on any of these levels of intrusion of value 
judgements in economics. Instead, with Myrdal, we concede that there is an inescapable 
a priori element in all scientific work and we also accept the ethical principle that 
remuneration should depend on performance, since we are interested in the legitimacy of 
different normative positions within capitalism and not in the moral legitimacy of 
capitalism. Finally, although with some greater reservation, we accept the ideological 
individualism that characterizes both Austrian and neoclassical normative economics. 
Even with these concessions, however, we claim that the passage from positive to 
normative analysis is still problematic. The objective of the paper is to point out the 
limits of Austrian economics in such a passage to normative economics. To this aim, we 
propose a comparison with neoclassical economics, and discuss the different theoretical   2
solutions adopted by these two schools of thought in their attempt to legitimize their 
normative discourse. 
The positive question examined consists in the determination of the mechanisms 
of working of the market. The normative question that flows from it consists in 
appraising the desirability of such mechanisms. It is obvious that the passage from the 
positive sphere to the normative one implies the introduction of value judgements, even 
leaving apart the three levels of ideological intrusion mentioned above. The scientific 
problem is thus one of minimizing the introduction of such judgements, by leaning as 
much as possible on an efficiency criterion, which be neutral from the viewpoint of 
values. The bridge between positive and normative analysis rests in this way upon two 
interdependent pillars, one of a technical nature (the efficiency criterion), the other of an 
ethical nature (a set of value judgements). The legitimacy of the normative discourse is 
all the greater since the role of the first pillar is important and the role played by the 
second one is weak. 
In the case of neoclassical theory, the efficiency criterion, considered ethically 
neutral, that is introduced in the passage from positive to normative analysis is the 
“Pareto principle”. Beside this criterion, the so-called “minimal benevolence principle” 
is introduced as ethical pillar. The latter is considered by the neoclassics as such an 
innocent value judgement to be largely shared. 
In the case of the Austrian theory, the technical pillar is the “coordination 
principle”, beside which so-called “quasi-universal” value judgements are introduced. 
As for the neoclassics, the latter are considered by the Austrians as so innocent to be 
almost unanimously shared. 
On the basis of their respective pillars, the two schools of thought derive their 
normative prescriptions starting from the results of their positive analyses. The aim of 
the paper is to examine the logical coherence of such a passage. 
 
We proceed as follows. We commence in section 2 with a short investigation in 
the field of the history of economic thought aiming at clarifying the definition here 
adopted of the Austrian school and its main peculiarities with respect to the neoclassical 
one. This will lead us to characterize the positive analysis of neoclassical economics and 
Austrian economics as founded respectively on the concept of equilibrium and on the   3
analysis of disequilibrium processes. In section 3, we present the pillars of the 
neoclassical and the Austrian bridges that sustain the passage from positive to normative 
analysis. A first problem for Austrian economics is that the adoption of the coordination 
principle turns out to be incompatible with process analysis. Such a problem is discussed 
in section 4. A second problem, which overwhelms both the schools of thought has to do 
with distribution. The discussion of the distributive issue is perhaps the hardest test for 
ethical neutrality, since it involves an explicit social appraisal of individual utilities and 
values. The theoretical solutions offered by the two schools of thought are presented in 
section 5. Our thesis is that whereas neoclassical economics formally passes the test, 
managing to preserve its theoretical consistency (although at a dear price on the ground 
of realism), Austrian economics does not pass it, its normative prescriptions resting upon 





2. The Originality of the Austrian Tradition 
 
  Austrian economics is not constituted into a unified paradigm as neoclassical 
economics. It is thus necessary to first identify what the basic features of this tradition 
are in order to clarify who are the authors we are referring to. 
  Since its birth in the work of Carl Menger (Menger1871), the Austrian school has 
been facing the problem of positioning itself as distinct and perhaps complementary to 
neoclassical economics, fighting against the widespread view interpreting its 
contributions as mere verbal versions of the neoclassical theory. After a long period of 
ambiguities, the Austrian position is now clear (Vaughn 1994): Austrians do not adhere 
to the formalist program endorsed by neoclassical authors, which in general terms, aims 
at the determination of the conditions under which a competitive equilibrium is reached; 
the Austrian research program may be defined instead as an attempt to analyze the 
market mechanism from a dynamic perspective, by defining competition as a   4
disequilibrium process rather than a state of affair.
1 Such a peculiarity directly flows 
from the specificity of the Austrian conception of subjectivism. 
  Austrian subjectivism is more radical than the neoclassical conception: it is not 
limited to preferences but is extended to expectations, costs, the conception of time and 
knowledge perception. We already find in Menger the germs of what was later called 
“dynamic subjectivism” (Menger 1871, 1883). According to O’Driscoll and Rizzo, 
dynamic subjectivism “[...]views the mind as an active, creative entity in which 
decision-making bears no determinate relationship to what went before”, whereas static 
subjectivism is characterized by the fact that “[...] the mind is viewed as a passive filter 
through which data of decision-making are perceived. To the extent that the filter can be 
understood, the whole process of decision-making is perfectly determinate” (O’Driscoll 
and Rizzo 1985, p. 22).  
  In line with this conception, individual choice is the result of an active process of 
the mind consisting in the adoption of specific objectives and in the laying down of a 
plan of actions intended to realize them in the best manner. This scheme distances itself 
from the neoclassical one in which individual objectives are limited to the maximization 
of utility and individual choice results from a comparison within a closed set of 
alternatives. Austrian subjectivism challenges such a mechanist conception of human 
behavior, limited to mere calculation.  
  The contrast between the orthodox homo oeconomicus simply reacting to 
external stimuli and the Austrian homo agens conceived as a dynamic actor radically 
modifies the research agenda: within the Austrian logic, the market is viewed as a 
process of continuous change whose dynamics precisely results from the interaction 
between subjective individual plans. 
 
  It is now possible to answer the initial question, namely who are the Austrians we 
are considering in this paper. Basically, we refer in what follows to Mises (with his 
economic theory of human action), Hayek (with his knowledge-based theory of 
competition) and their modern followers, that is to say Rothbard (faithful to the  
                                                           
1  The interest in process analysis as a tenet of Austrian economics has been clearly stated for the first 
time by Mayer: the author criticized the formalist approach, or “functional theories”, aiming to 
describe the relation between already existing prices in an equilibrium situation. Mayer proposed to 
refocus on the process of price formation by adopting a “causal-genetic” approach (Mayer 1932).    5
praxeological logic of Mises) and Kirzner (at the junction of Mises’s principle of human 
action and Hayek’s problem of knowledge). We deliberately exclude Lachmann and his 
followers from this definition: as argued elsewhere by one of the authors (Gloria-
Palermo 1999), Lachmann may well be considered, from an historiographical point of 
view, as the most faithful follower of Menger’s principles, picking the subjectivist 
program up to its furthest implications. However the theoretical result to which this 
approach leads are indeed overwhelming, since it becomes impossible to prove that the 
market process is equilibrating (Lachmann 1969, 1986). This is perhaps the reason why 
Lachmann and his followers are considered by Rothbardians and Kirznerians as Austrian 
dissenters. 
  Even with these clarifications, however, it is clear that there exists no monolithic 
Austrian theory of the market process. All the authors agree in defining competition as a 
disequilibrium process in the sense that an equilibrium exists (at least as a theoretical 
reference), but the system is not generally in it. Beyond this general proposition, 
however, substantial differences remain among the authors, concerning in particular two 
aspects: (1) the content of the equilibrium reference that varies from one author to the 
other and even in the work of the same author from one period to the other and (2) the 
theoretical role played by this equilibrium reference.  
  Mises and Rothbard define equilibrium as an “imaginary construction” in which 
individuals have no reason to act; equilibrium is a state of affair in which there is no 
place for human action. Kirzner refers to the traditional meaning of equilibrium and 
places his analysis as complementary to mainstream economics; there is a sort of 
division of labor in the sense that neoclassics have been, from the 1930s onwards, 
progressively led astray into a more and more formalist analysis whose direct 
consequence was an overemphasis on the concept of equilibrium and the Austrian task 
may be viewed as an attempt to counterbalance this tendency by focusing rather on the 
process that leads to this equilibrium (Kirzner 1973, p. 1). Hayek has altered three times 
his conception of equilibrium throughout his career, passing from the traditional 
neoclassical idea that underlies his trade cycle theory and his first arguments in the 
planning debate, to the idea of mutual compatibility of plans since his famous 1937   6
paper “Economics and Knowledge”, and finally, in the 1970s, to the notion of order in 
his theory of cultural evolution.
2 
  As regards the role played by the reference to equilibrium, Kirznerians, 
Hayekians and Misesians propose three distinct approaches: to Kirzner, the equilibrating 
tendency of the market process is so powerful that the system can eventually reach a 
final state of equilibrium.
3 According to Hayek, the continuous occurrence of 
unexpected changes prevents the economy from reaching any final state of affair; 
notwithstanding this, it is possible to define a continually moving equilibrium reference 
supposed to attract the system.
4 The approach of Mises and Rothbard consists in starting 
from the imaginary construction of equilibrium; the dynamic effects of human action are 
precisely derived from the hypothetical consequences of the absence of action, allowing 
to grasp the direction the economy would necessarily take.
5 
  Notwithstanding all these distinctions, it is possible to accept, for the purpose of 
this paper, the following characterization of Austrian economics: the economic actor is 
the propeller of change, the dynamic force of the market process; the market process is 
the outcome of the interaction of individual subjective plans and the analytical issue 
consists in appraising the ability of the market to achieve an efficient coordination of 
these plans. Neoclassical economics, by contrast, directly starts from an equilibrium 
configuration and examines the relationships between economic variables that 
characterize such a configuration. It is in these two distinct frameworks that Austrians 
and neoclassics face the problem of value judgements as defined in the next section. 
                                                           
2 Notwithstanding all these successive changes in the meaning of equilibrium, the idea of an 
equilibrating tendency of the market remains a constant of the Hayekian thought (Gloria-Palermo 
2001). 
3  Although it is out of the purposes of this paper to criticize the positive contents of the theories of 
convergence toward equilibrium of the Austrian authors considered, we must notice that they all 
present theoretical problems. In the case of Kirzner, the analysis is subject to the same problem of 
stability as the general equilibrium theory; Kirzner, however, seems to conceal the issue or, in any case, 
does not bring any decisive contribution to it (Palermo 1997). 
4  The problem with Hayek is that he does not provide any theory explaining the movements in time of 
the equilibrium attracting the system. The problem is serious since these movements are not put in 
relation with the incompatibility of plans realized during the disequilibrium process, but are considered 
as completely exogenous. On the matter, Ioannides has elaborated an example showing that continuous 
changes, as conceptualized by Hayek, may mean nothing more than the constant repetition of the same 
motion (Ioannides 1992). 
5  Cf. Cowen and Fink 1985 for a destructive criticism of the Mises-Rothbard imaginary construction of 
equilibrium. They show that there is no explanation for the convergence path toward equilibrium: all 
that the theory implies is that if disequilibrium forces are frozen (income effects, non-convexities, 
strategic behaviors, …), then the equilibrating forces will prevail. Moreover, the authors show that the 
institution of monetary prices cannot logically exist in the Mises-Rothbard framework.    7
3. The Bridge Between Positive and Normative Analysis 
 
  The necessity for eliminating value judgements from economic theory is an old 
idea whose origin goes back to Hume’s postulate according to which it is not 
scientifically correct to deduce what ought to be from what is. Facts and values should 
be rigorously separated; science should concentrate on facts and be value-free, whereas 
value judgements should enter the domain of art, which focuses on what should be. This 
idea has been advocated in economics through the distinction between positive 
economics, which should be value-free, and normative economics in which value 
judgements should be explicitly introduced. The persistence of this position during the 
twentieth century finds its greatest systematization in the doctrine of “wertfreiheit” 
(value-freedom) developed by Max Weber. According to Weber, the social scientist 
should remain value-free and, parallel to this, the moral scientist should develop a 
coherent discourse on ethical values (“wertungsdiskussionen”). 
  The neoclassical response to the problem of value judgements, has been the 
development, in the 1930s, of the so-called new welfare economics, based on the 
efficiency principle of “Pareto” and the ethical principle of “minimal benevolence”. 
Austrian economics has remained attached to the Humean guillotine by proposing, for 
its part, the “coordination principle” and the so-called “quasi-universal value 
judgements” as technical and ethical pillars of its bridge to normative analysis. 
 
 
Pareto Principle and Minimal Benevolence 
 
A first influential criticism against the epistemological basis of Pigouvian welfare 
economics, based on interpersonal comparisons, was raised by Robbins, who defended 
the objectivity of economic analysis by proposing to exclude not only value judgements, 
but also the discussion of value judgements, from economics (Robbins 1932). 
  The idea that Paretian welfare economics is value-free was then defended by 
Archibald and Hennipman (Archibald 1959; Hennipman 1976). The argument is that 
Paretian welfare economics simply studies the effectiveness of alternative 
configurations, by comparing the utilities of each individual taken separately. No value   8
judgement is required to establish a comparison according to the Pareto principle. Value 
judgements enter only at the crucial step of normative prescription. To put it differently, 
to say that B is Pareto superior to A involves no value judgement; to prescribe B when A 
and B are both feasible necessarily involves value judgements. But if prescriptions are 
left apart, the propositions of Paretian welfare economics are susceptible to be 
empirically tested like any other positive proposition. In this sense, according to 
Archibald, welfare theorems must be considered theorems of positive economics. For 
instance, propositions like “perfectly competitive equilibria imply Pareto optimality” or 
“monopoly equilibria imply a welfare loss” are true or false independently from any 
value judgement or ideological position. They are thus positive statements. If, however, 
prescriptions are to be derived from these positive statements, then value judgements 
must be introduced in a form or another: what is needed is in fact a simple value-
judgement according to which it is desirable to eliminate the inefficiency stemming from 
the existence of a potential Pareto improvement. Such a value judgement flows from the 
apparently innocuous moral principle of minimal benevolence: other things being equal, 
it is a morally good thing if people are better off.
6  
  This principle, according to the neoclassics, contains the minimal ethical position 
necessary to translate the positive statements of the new welfare economics in normative 
terms. If one accepts minimal benevolence, then, other things being equal, Pareto 




Coordination Principle and Quasi-Universal Value Judgements 
 
Despite the homogeneity of the normative discourse in favor of the free market, 
there is hardly such a thing as an Austrian welfare economics.
8  
                                                           
6  For a critical discussion on the role of minimal benevolence in the passage from positive to normative 
economics, cf. Hausman and McPherson 1996, chap. 4. 
7  In light of the limited applicability of the Pareto criterion, neoclassical economics has developed along 
two alternative paths: (1) the definition of a social welfare function, which explicitly introduces value 
judgements and is, among other things, subject to the Arrow’s impossibility theorem if one tries to 
build it as an aggregation of individual preferences (Bergson 1938; Samuelson 1947; Arrow 1951); (2) 
the elaboration of compensation criteria à la Kaldor and Hicks, which, however, may be subject to 
theoretical paradoxes (Kaldor 1939; Hicks 1940; Scitovsky 1941; Little 1950; Samuelson 1950). 
8  On the difficulty of identifying an Austrian welfare economics, cf. Cowen 1991, 1994.   9
It is however possible to single out some common features among the authors, in 
particular their reliance upon the principle of coordination as efficiency criterion (if this 
principle is to be understood in a very general sense) and their reliance upon a set of 
value judgements that displays their adhesion to the liberal doctrine.  
 
Mises characterizes the Austrian position as a formal system: the praxeological 
system (Mises 1949). Praxeology is “the general theory of human action” (Mises 1949, 
p. 3). It concerns the set of implications logically deduced from the sole axiom of human 
action according to which action is purposeful. The whole set of praxeological sciences 
is built upon this subjectivist dimension according to which human choice must be 
distinguished from passive response to the environment. Praxeological propositions are 
made up of universally valid statements, completely independent of the personal values 
of the scientist for individuals’ goals and means are not the object of investigation. 
Economics is a component part of praxeology that focuses on a particular type of human 
action: market interactions.  
  According to praxeology, the criterion used to appraise the efficiency of an 
economic configuration should meet two requirements, namely subjectivism and value 
freedom. An economic system is efficient insofar as it allows individuals to follow their 
subjective plans with no incursion from the theorist on the nature of their goals and of 
the chosen means. Accordingly, an efficient situation is one in which individual plans 
are fully compatible, namely, a situation of coordination. 
  As Rothbard underlies, praxeology (and thus economics) is not sufficient by 
itself to enable the theorist to make any normative statement (Rothbard 1956, 1976). The 
passage to policy pronouncements needs the previous establishment of an explicit ethics. 
According to Rothbard, Mises introduced the minimal possible degree of value 
judgement in his application of the results of praxeology to politics: “[…] his value 
judgement is the desirability of fulfilling the subjectively desired goals of the bulk of the 
populace” (Rothbard 1976, p. 105). This statement plays the same role as the minimal 
benevolence principle in the neoclassical framework. It simply means that it is desirable 
that people could act according to their will. This is nothing else than the classical liberal 
doctrine that morally enhances the values of liberty, of individual sovereignty and   10
promotes the voluntarism of choices.
9 These values are presented as being so innocuous 
that almost nobody would question them and are in this sense defined as “quasi-
universal”.
10  
  Though discarding the praxeological framework, Kirzner and Hayek reach 
similar results. In line with Austrian subjectivism, these authors develop an analytical 
framework that preserves the individuality of the purposes of the separate individuals. In 
this perspective, the Pareto principle is replaced by the coordination criterion that strictly 
respects “the individuality of individual purposes” (Kirzner 1976, p. 85). The notion of 
coordination is simply understood as the fulfillment of the unaggregated preference 
structure of the individuals and refers to a situation in which there is full compatibility 
among individual plans.
11 What is the set of value judgements associated with this 
efficiency criterion? According to the authors, what is good is the efficiency criterion 
itself, or, in other words, coordination is good per se. This ethical position is very close 
to the neoclassical minimal benevolence principle: it is a morally good thing if people 
realize their subjective plans of action. 
  At a strict positive level, Hayek and Kirzner analyze the market process as a 
procedure that is more efficient than alternative arrangements in discovering and 
spreading new knowledge that can be used by all the members of the system to modify 
their plans toward a better fulfillment of their respective ends (Hayek 1978, p. 180; 
                                                           
9  This is particularly clear in Mises: “Liberalism (i.e. laissez-faire liberalism) is a political doctrine.[…] 
As a political doctrine liberalism (in contrast to economic science) is not neutral with regard to values 
and ultimate ends sought by action. It assumes that all men or at least the majority of people are intent 
upon attaining certain goals. It gives them information about the means suitable for the realization of 
their plans. The champions of liberal doctrines are fully aware of the fact that their teachings are valid 
only for people who are committed to their valuational principles. While praxeology, and therefore 
economics too, uses the terms happiness and removal of uneasiness in a purely formal sense, liberalism 
attaches to them a concrete meaning. It presupposes that people prefer life to death, health to sickness, 
nourishment to starvation, abundance to poverty. It teaches man how to act in accordance with these 
valuations” (Mises 1949, pp. 153-4). The values underlying the liberal doctrine are presented in such a 
way of being hardly questionable. It is in this sense that they are quasi-universal. Blaug’s comment on 
this characterization of value judgement is straightforward: “This is a silly characterization of value-
judgements for, by definition, value judgements are ethical prescriptions that are much debated!” 
(Blaug 1980, chap. 5). 
10 At a more precise scrutiny however, the praxeologically-based defense of the free market turns out to 
be built on a tautology: if the unhampered market is defined as a system in which people interact 
peacefully, without violence through voluntary agreements (Rothbard 1962) and if voluntarism is 
ethically good for it enables individuals to fulfil their goals whatever they be (Mises’s minimal value 
judgement) then by definition the unhampered market is desirable.  
11 Kirzner affirms that “Modern Austrians have converged on the notion of coordination as the key to 
normative discussion” (Kirzner 1987, p. 11, emphasis in original); this concept can already be found in 
Hayek’s paper “Economics and Knowledge” (Hayek 1937) and is made explicit in particular in 
Kirzner’s main book (Kirzner 1973).   11
Kirzner 1992, p. 60). To put it differently, competition is successful in spreading new 
knowledge and leads to increasing degrees of coordination. According to the authors, 
this positive result provides a scientific support to those who promote a society of 
unhampered markets as soon as one espouses the liberal doctrine that overrides the 




To recap, all modern Austrians here examined agree to replace the Pareto 
criterion with the coordination principle if this principle is understood in a very general 
sense as the fulfillment of individual plans. The associated ethics is made up of a set of 
value judgements derived from the liberal doctrine and presented as arousing quasi-
unanimous consent. The combination of these two pillars is the ultimate theoretical 




4. Coordination Principle and Disequilibrium Analysis  
 
The problem of convergence of the market process concerns the effects of market 
interactions on the compatibility of individual plans: the market process is said to be 
convergent if it generates processes of revision of individual plans that lead to the 
eliminate all the (eventual) incompatibilities.
13 For the market process to converge, it is 
necessary that (1) by interacting in the market, individuals modify their plans according 
to the signals provided by market interactions and that (2) such signals be sufficient to 
lead individuals to formulate more and more compatible plans.  
                                                           
12 The difference however between Mises and Rothbard on the one hand and Hayek and Kirzner on the 
other hand, is that praxeology maintains that by definition when a person acts, his ex ante utility 
increases (Rothbard 1976, p. 98); in other words, the very fact of being engaged in a transaction means 
that a more coordinated situation is expected by the participants. This however does not prove that this 
will effectively occur, putting some doubt on the coherence of their pro-market normative stance. 
Hayek and Kirzner on the contrary make the case for the free market on the basis of the positive results 
of their theories of convergence of the market process, by articulating the idea of convergence toward 
coordination with the knowledge problem. 
13 In the Austrian terminology, expressions such as “convergence of knowledge”, “convergence of 
expectations”, etc. are used to mean that in the market process, knowledge, expectation, etc. are 
modified in such a way to eliminate plans incompatibilities.   12
  Hayek and Kirzner analyze the process of convergence by focusing on the effects 
of market interactions on individual knowledge. Their idea is that market interactions 
spread knowledge among individuals leading them to modify their plans in such a way 
to progressively eliminate the existing incompatibilities.  
  According to Hayek, knowledge is time and place specific and the potentiality of 
the market process lies in the possibility to exploit such a specificity instead of 
eliminating it (Hayek 1945, 1949, 1978). Indeed, the convergence of the market process 
does not imply at all that individuals end up with a common knowledge; on the contrary, 
it is their different knowledge that allows them to formulate plans that, in the course of 
the market process, become more and more compatible.  
  The process of convergence is specified in more details in Kirzner’s theory of 
entrepreneurship (Kirzner 1973). It is the alertness of individuals (entrepreneurs in 
particular) that assures the convergence of the market process: alert entrepreneurs 
perceive the existing profit opportunities and by exploiting them, progressively eliminate 
all the manifestations of disequilibrium. 
 
The objective here is not to criticize the relevance of the Austrian theory of the 
market process.
14 Let us proceed instead as if this theory were analytically satisfactory 
and let us focus on the relation between the theory of convergence and the use of the 
principle of coordination as technical pillar of the bridge to normative analysis. 
  Remember that in the Austrian framework, the market process is by definition a 
process in which individuals do not realize their plans. Indeed, the analysis is coherent 
only to the extent that equilibrium (or full coordination) is not reached, otherwise there 
would be no market process: if plans became compatible during the market process, the 
process itself would end. The market process is instead characterized by continuous 
unexpected changes, which prevents full coordination from being obtained. 
 
                                                           
14 Elsewhere we have criticized the ability of the Austrian market process theory to guarantee, under 
general conditions, the convergence of individual plans (Palermo 1997; Gloria-Palermo 1999).   13
But now, if the positive framework is developed to analyze the process, the normative 
evaluation too should refer to the process and not to an hypothetical (never reached) 
final state.
15 
  The contradiction is thus straightforward: on the one hand, the Austrian theory 
rests on the necessary assumption that individuals act in a situation of lack of 
coordination, whereas, on the other hand, the market is considered efficient (and 
desirable). But, if the normative criterion is coordination, how could one argue for the 
desirability of a system that, by assumption, is dis-coordinated? 
  The hypothesis that full coordination is never reached considerably question the 
internal consistency of the coordination principle as technical pillar of the bridge 
between positive and normative analysis and casts doubts on the overall argumentation 
in favor of the desirability of the free market. To be rigorous, the Austrian theory only 
allows to deduce a negative evaluation of the free market system: conceded that the 
working of free competition be correctly represented by the Austrian theory and 
accepted the coordination principle as efficiency criterion, then the free market system is 
inefficient (and, thus, according to the Austrian second pillar, undesirable).  
  There is however one possible way out consisting in giving a soft interpretation 
of Austrian positive results: one might argue that, among all institutional systems, the 
free market is perhaps the less worse.  
  But, is it possible to set such an institutional comparison within the Austrian 
framework? As said above, the principle of coordination is useless, since it is 
inconsistent with one of the methodological tenets of the Austrian theory (in the 
Austrian dynamic framework, individuals, at least partly, do not realize their plans). The 
only way out should be to measure the degree of dis-coordination in order to compare 
different systems from the viewpoint of their relative ability in making individual plans 
compatible. In that perspective, what the Austrians should prove is that the unhampered 
market process produces less dis-coordination than other processes of social interaction 
(planning for instance). Such a project, however, encounters a serious obstacle. The 
                                                           
15 From an analytical viewpoint, this contradiction is the result of the assumption of a dynamic positive 
framework and of an efficiency principle for normative analysis that resembles too much the static 
concept of equilibrium. As a matter of fact, if coordination might ever be reached, i.e., if plans might 
effectively become fully compatible, the concept of coordination would coincide with that of 
equilibrium. On the other hand, if the concept of coordination is defined in such a way to contemplate 
some forms of plans incompatibilities, then it can no longer be accepted as a purely efficiency pillar of 
the bridge to normative analysis.   14
attempt to compare different institutional settings within the Austrian disequilibrium 
framework and identify the less dis-coordinated one raises two problems: (1) the 
problem of specifying who are the agents whose plans can remain unfulfilled without, 
because of this, questioning the overall desirability of the system (or, symmetrically, 
who are the agents whose plans must be fulfilled in order that the system be considered 
desirable); (2) the problem of determining a critical measure of plans inconsistency 
marking the formal passage from coordination to dis-coordination. These problems 
cannot be handled without introducing (1) a criterion for interpersonal comparisons and 
(2) value judgements about the content of individual plans necessarily stronger than the 
innocent quasi-universal ones. In any case, all this would put a weight over the bridge 
between positive and normative analysis that the coordination principle and the quasi-




5. The Problem of Distribution  
 
One of the main fields of normative analysis in which ethical positions can 
hardly be left aside is the discussion of distribution. In capitalism, production and 
distribution are two interdependent processes. Private property of the means of 
production implies that owners can claim a reward for the services of their production 
factors. The participation to the production process is thus itself based on the conditions 
that rule the distribution of the product. Particular cases apart, interventions in the sphere 
of production have distributive effects and interventions in the sphere of distribution 
have effects on production, so that production and distribution cannot in general be 
analyzed separately. 
  At an intuitive level, the interdependence of production and distribution may 
create problems as far as value-neutrality is concerned, since even apparently technical 
issues, such as the determination of the conditions for efficient production, have in fact 
distributive implications. This means that even normative prescriptions at the production 
level might in fact not be neutral in terms of distributive justice.   15
  The solutions offered to this problem by neoclassical economics and Austrian 
economics are different: neoclassical economics has managed to determine the 
conditions under which production and distribution can be analytically separated and, in 
such a way, has found a formal solution to the problem of value judgements; such a 
solution however is obtained at a dear price on the ground of realism. Austrian 
economics, on the contrary, has developed a theory based precisely on the 
interdependence between production and distribution; this approach, however, 
surreptitiously introduces strong value judgements. 
 
 
Production and Distribution in the General Equilibrium Model 
 
Consider the general equilibrium model. Here production and distribution are 
interdependent: the equilibrium allocation determined by the initial conditions 
concerning technology, individual endowments and preferences simultaneously solves 
both production and distribution problems. 
  The fact that production and distribution take place simultaneously (and 
instantaneously) in the general equilibrium model might create ethical problems in case 
the production solution (which, under opportune conditions, is proven to be Pareto 
efficient) were not also ethically acceptable as far as its distributive consequences are 
concerned. But here, thanks to the two fundamental theorems of welfare, neoclassical 
economics can formally separate the questions of production and distribution. Let us see 
how. 
  The two fundamental theorems of welfare economics state that (1) general 
equilibrium is Pareto efficient and (2) every Pareto efficient allocation can be obtained 
as a solution of a general equilibrium model.  
  If the minimal benevolence principle is accepted, these theorems have direct 
normative implications: the first theorem implies that, other things being equal, perfectly 
competitive equilibria are morally desirable and market imperfections that interfere with 
their achievement are morally undesirable;
16 among the “other things that must be equal” 
                                                           
16 This is, of course, a theoretical defense of perfect competition, not a defense of actual markets or of 
laissez-faire policies and it is only a defense of perfect competition, other things being equal (cf. 
Hausman and McPherson 1996, pp. 42-3).   16
in order to translate the Pareto principle into a moral principle, there are however things 
which are more ethically controversial than minimal benevolence, like justice and, more 
specifically, distributive justice: a Pareto improvement that leads to distributive injustice 
might be morally undesirable. Here, however, the second welfare theorem enters the 
scene: all moral concerns about distributive justice can be solved by adjusting initial 
endowments (by means of lump-sum taxes/transfers) and letting perfect competition do 
the rest. 
  These theorems constitute a powerful apolitical shield against potential ethical 
attacks: there exist two separated problems, the production of a big pie and the 
distribution of the pie. The second fundamental theorem of welfare states that for each 
ethical judgement about the criterion for the distribution of the pie, the market 
mechanism allows to obtain the greatest possible pie. If we are not satisfied with the 
existing distribution, the neoclassical economist argues, let us change it, but, after that, it 
would be silly (immoral) to be satisfied with a pie which is not the greatest possible one. 
Although production and distribution processes are interdependent, the two fundamental 
theorems of welfare allow in this way to analyze them separately.
17 
  It is appropriate at this point to draw attention to some of the necessary 
conditions under which the two theorems of welfare hold: there are (1) no increasing 
returns to scale, (2) no externalities and (3) no public goods. Notwithstanding the lack of 
realism of these conditions (the problem is not simply that there exist markets which do 
not respect these conditions, but rather that there is practically no market in which the 
three conditions hold), neoclassical economics formally solves the problem of 
distribution. 
  To recap then, the passage from the positive interpretation of Paretian welfare 
economics to the normative one is based on the acceptance of a relatively weak value 
judgement (the minimal benevolence principle). This implies that Paretian welfare 
economics cannot be considered rigorously value-free. However, thanks to the analytical 
results contained in the two welfare theorems, neoclassical economics can go much 
                                                           
17 One manifestation of the possibility of separating production and distribution can be found in the so-
called Coase theorem – formulated by Stigler (Stigler 1989), who draws inspiration from the work of 
Coase (Coase 1960) – in which it is asserted that the initial distribution of (private) property rights do 
not influence the production configuration of the system. Notice however that Coase himself, in his 
1960 article, insists upon the paradoxical character of such a result, which depends on the highly 
unrealistic assumption of the absence of transaction costs.   17
further in the normative ground, overcoming one of the main normative problem of 
welfare economics: the problem of distribution.
18 
  Some caution should instead be paid to the effective value-freedom of the 
approaches aiming at more realistic analyses developed as extensions of the pure 
Walrasian model. Here, we do not refer only to the neoclassical literature on the second 
best, but also to the works of the New Keynesian and the New Institutional Economics, 
in which imperfect information, bounded rationality or other imperfections of the 
Walrasian model prevents Pareto efficiency from being obtained. In these conditions, the 
prescription of Pareto improvement cannot be considered neutral because its distributive 
implications have to be taken as they come. If we do not like distribution, the argument 
“let us change it, but, after that, it would be silly (immoral) to be satisfied with a pie 
which is not the greatest possible one” no longer works. In this case, there is thus a 
contradiction, since, on the one hand, these approaches define a problematic theoretical 
context in which the two welfare theorems do not hold, but, on the other hand, they still 
insist on the Pareto criterion as efficiency criterion for their normative prescriptions. 
 
 
Production and Distribution in the Austrian Theory 
 
The interdependence of the processes of production and distribution is at the core 
of Austrian normative economics. Let us examine, in this respect, the leading 
contributions of Mises and Hayek. 
  In line with the coordination principle, Mises defines the efficiency of an 
economic system as depending on the possibility for individuals to freely pursue their 
goals, both in the sphere of consumption and in that of production. Individual 
sovereignty is thus not limited to consumers, but is extended to the whole set of 
                                                           
18 If the first and second welfare theorems provide a solution to the problem of analytically separating 
production and distribution, the so-called impossibility theorem (Arrow 1951) affirms that there is no 
logically infallible way to aggregate the preferences of diverse individuals and there is thus no logically 
infallible way to solve the problem of distribution by means of democratically voting. This result 
(known also as the third welfare theorem) invalidates the message of the first two welfare theorems 
about the supposed desirability of the free market and laissez-faire in capitalist democracies: it is true 
that the market mechanism does not raise distributive problems if the two welfare theorems hold, but it 
is also true that because of the third theorem, such a mechanism is incompatible with the principles of 
democracy.   18
economic agents and in particular, to producers. Consumers’ ability to achieve their 
goals depends on the ability of producers to offer the appropriate goods. The efficient 
entrepreneurs are those who best anticipate the wishes of consumers and find the best 
means to realize them. In this way, the efficiency of the overall system is amount to the 
efficiency of production. The efficiency of production, in turn, is the result of a process 
of competition among entrepreneurs motivated by the prospect of making profits.  
 
The more successfully [the entrepreneur] speculates the more the means of production are at 
his disposal, the greater becomes his influence on the business of society. The less 
successfully he speculates the smaller becomes his property, the less becomes his influence 
on business. If he loses everything by speculation he disappears from the ranks of those 
who are called to the direction of economic affairs. (Mises 1936, p. 206) 
 
The crucial aspect here does not concern the justification of the appropriation of 
profits, an aspect that we have deliberately excluded from the inquiry of this paper, but 
rather the fact that, contrary to the neoclassical position synthesized in the second 
welfare theorem, Mises rejects any kind of redistribution, i.e., any distribution different 
from that which directly flows from the production process. The production process, in 
its (supposed) efficient working, determines income distribution too. In other words, 
Mises considers efficient production as an indisputable social objective, which implies 
that its consequences in the sphere of distribution must be accepted as they come. In this 
way, the wertfreiheit principle assumes a very particular form in the Misesian 
comparative analysis: it leads to the neglect of any autonomous relevance of the 
distributive issue.
19  
  According to Hayek, the efficiency of an economic system depends on the 
solution it can offer to two general problems: the problem of incentives and the problem 
of knowledge. In the Hayekian theory these problems are strictly interrelated: an 
efficient economic system should display a mechanism that allows individuals to 
discover the most relevant bits of knowledge and an efficient incentive device should 
ensure that scarce resources be allocated to the most competent agents with respect to 
their ability in discovering, diffusing and using the relevant specific knowledge. 
                                                           
19 Rothbard puts it as follows: “There is no distributional process apart from the production and exchange 
processes of the market; hence the very concept of ‘distribution’ becomes meaningless in the free 
market” (Rothbard 1956 p. 251),.   19
According to Hayek, the market process, if not hampered, automatically transfers 
resources from the less competent individuals (with respect to their contribution to the 
knowledge problem) to the most competent ones, efficiently solving in this way the 
knowledge problem. This result is based on the twofold assumption of non-
appropriability of knowledge and appropriability of profits: as soon as a new set of 
knowledge is made available, the whole society may enjoy its beneficial effects in terms 
of social coordination, but the discoverer alone enjoys the beneficial effects of the 
discovery in terms of generated profits. As for Mises, market incentives are efficient 
only if profits can be appropriated with no obstacles. In this way, Hayek’s normative 
analysis of incentive and knowledge problems leads to the definition of the production 
of a big pie (or, rather perhaps, the discovery of a big pie) as a social objective and to the 
distributive prescription that scarce resources be allocated according to the contribution 
of each person (in terms of knowledge discovery) to the production of the pie.
20 Kirzner 
summarizes the whole Austrian position as follows: 
 
The market system is seen in this discussion as not only producing a social ‘pie’, but at the 
same time slicing up that pie and assigning the respective slices to the specific individuals 
who participate in the market process. […] In fact the size and composition of the pie are as 
much dependent upon the pattern of income ‘distribution’ as the latter depends on the size 
and composition of the pie. (Kirzner 1989, p. 8) 
 
Differently from the neoclassical case, redistribution is considered, by definition, 
scientifically illegitimate. Although both neoclassical and Austrian economics accept the 
general principle that remuneration should depend on performance, the latter pushes the 
principle further, putting even the initial distribution of the endowments out of any 
ethical inquiry.  
The fact that the only tolerated social objective is efficient production in a 
context in which distribution is just a consequence of production allows to clarify the 
Austrian position with respect to the distributive issue: Austrian economics does not 
                                                           
20 According to Hayek, social justice is a harmful concept (Hayek 1976). For Hayek, it basically means 
one thing: the protection of (in the sense of maintaining or increasing) the material position of 
particular groups; any intervention of this kind leads to the destruction of the foundations of the market 
order, i.e., to be more precise, the destruction of the incentives that each person has to discover what is 
of value to others.   20
really neglect the distributive problem, it simply approves the free market solution and 






Inasmuch as the Pareto principle and the coordination principle can be applied 
without the need of making interpersonal comparisons, some of their proponents have 
maintained that they are value-free. Such a position is however untenable. 
  At a general level, both neoclassical and Austrian economics rest on value-
judgements at least because the principles that remuneration should depend on 
performance and that the individual is the best judge of his own well-being are 
themselves value-judgements. These general principles, however, are still insufficient to 
allow neoclassical and Austrian economics to build a legitimate normative theory.  
  In the attempt to introduce only the value judgements that are strictly necessary 
to support a normative position, the neoclassics and the Austrians have introduced 
respectively the minimal benevolence principle and the quasi-universal value 
judgements. Even with these explicit ethical positions, however, the normative discourse 
remains largely unfounded in both the approaches, although for different reasons. In the 
case of neoclassical economics the main problem is one of realism. In the case of 
Austrian economics it is one of internal consistency.  
  In order to point out these problems we have considered the ways in which the 
two approaches discuss the distributive issue, which constitutes in our view the field in 
which the problem of value judgements takes its most exacerbated form. 
  In capitalism, production and distribution are interdependent processes. In 
principle, such an interdependency is sufficient to create problems to the value-free 
economist in his attempt to provide a normative criterion at the production level 
(because it implies the acceptance of a determined distribution, the latter being the result 
of value judgements). Neoclassical  economics, in order to overcome the obstacle, has 
determined the conditions under which production and distribution can be analyzed 
separately and, in doing so, has confined itself to an abstract world which has nothing to   21
do with the real one (in which production and distribution continue to be interdependent) 
but, at the same time, has saved its formal integrity (which applies only to its abstract 
world). What is scientifically surprising, however, is that once affirmed the legitimacy of 
the Pareto principle in the particular abstract world in which the two welfare theorems 
hold, neoclassical economists have then pretended to apply it to the real world. 
  Austrian economics, on the contrary, has accepted the theoretical challenge by 
building its theory precisely on the interdependence of production and distribution. The 
problem is that it has then lost the challenge because its position on distribution cannot 
be coherently defended simply on the basis of the weak quasi-universal value 
judgements. The ethical pillar has so proven to be insufficient to support the Austrian 
normative position in favor of the free market and the result is a normative framework in 
which strong value judgements are indeed present, although awkwardly hidden.  
  However, it is probably the consequences of the fragility of the other pillar to be 
even more disastrous for the internal consistency of the Austrian theory. The 
coordination principle indeed ends up being logically inconsistent with the features of 
the Austrian positive analysis, which even impedes the appraisal of efficiency (which is 
the first step for the appraisal of desirability). 
  At the analytical level, what is interesting is that the Austrian normative criterion, 
if rigorously applied, ultimately leads to opposite results with respect to the liberal 
doctrine that it supports: all that can be deduced from the Austrian theory is a negative 
evaluation of free competition. Moreover, any attempt to go beyond this negative result 
needs the introduction of stronger value judgements and creates internal consistency 
problems to those who affirm that no such values should be introduced.  
  Our conclusion is thus that the normative engagement of Austrian economics in 
favor of the free market and laissez-faire is the result of a mix of strong ideological 
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